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The article presents (the author’s view of) the ideology of the 
present-day revolutionary government in Greece as contained 
in its strategy and tactics. Within a historical perspective, the 
author discusses the regime’s nationalism, neutrality, the role 
of the monarchy in Greece, and Greece’s relations to her neigh­
bors and to the super powers. The prime minister, George Pa­
padopoulos, is viewed from the standpoint of other modern 
leaders including Andreas Papandreou, Ceausescu and Charles 
deGauIle. [j. chernoff]
I. The ideology of the regime 
contained in its strategy
A. Chauvinistic or egalitarian nationalism? In many 
places of the world to-day, small countries are strug­
gling to get rid of powerful protectors. But many see 
their efforts survive for a few years and then fail. 
The story of conflict between the powerful and the 
feeble is an old story and the great powers have long 
been acquainted with discovering the multiple tricks 
imagined by small nations to become more inde­
pendent. At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the 
Rumanian Prime Minister suggested to the Greek 
Prime Minister that small States present at the Con­
ference stick together in order to resist the pressure 
of the big States, but the Greek Prime Minister an­
swered that he must be naïve to think it possible for 
small nations to resist the will of the big ones.
Hierarchy means dependency and dependency means 
lack of liberty. Nations, like individuals, wish to be 
different, they do not want to be unequal. The struggle 
for equality, against hierarchy, is universal: against 
the hierarchy of races, against the hierarchy of 
classes, against the hierarchy inside professions, a- 
gainst the hierarchy of ages, against the hierarchy of 
sex, against the hierarchy of nations. But this means 
necessarily struggle for power. The danger is to see 
the hierarchy reversed when the feeble succeeds in 
overcoming the strong. If you say Black is beautiful 
you must also think White is beautiful and if you 
say Greece is beautiful you must think the United 
States are beautiful too: this is egalitarian nationalism 
as opposed to chauvinistic nationalism.
Prime Minister Papadopulos has repeatedly stated 
that he is the only one responsible for the foreign 
policy of his country and it seems to-day that the 
leader of the 1967 military coup has complete control 
of his regime. Not only there will not be war with 
Albania, but even though there has been no treaty 
of peace signed between the two countries since the 
second world war, for the first time in January of 
this year* an Albanian commercial delegation visited 
Athens and a Greco-Albanian commercial agreement 
was signed. Publicity was also given to another 
Albanian commercial delegation who came to Athens 
last May.
* 10th September 1970. Public talk delivered at Marquette 
University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, USA.
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When Prime Minister Papadopulos speaks of 
Greece, he does it passionately. His passion is so 
evident that his opponents have declared him mad. 
But one could not say that he believes in chauvinistic 
nationalism, like Ladas. Unfortunately, as he never 
made a clear statement supporting egalitarian na­
tionalism, the doubt as to which of these two nation­
alisms he is a supporter, remains. Nevertheless, when 
asked about Greco-Turkish friendship, he said one 
should not give too much importance to the unilateral 
presentation of Greco-Turkish History in both 
countries as it is a natural tendency for each nation 
to exalt its own military successes, a statement that 
is definitely not chauvinistic. In addition, a few weeks 
after the declarations of Colonel Ladas on southern 
Albania, Prime Minister Papadopulos solemnly stat­
ed that Greece does not have expansionist views 
against other countries.
B. Dogmatic Neutralism or pragmatism? Neutralism 
sprung out of realism after the second world war: 
small nations did not feel involved in the ideological 
dispute between the two super-powers. They were 
only preoccupied with the interests of their own 
countries which had been so long sacrificed to the 
interests of the great powers. Nationalists used neu­
tralism to attain their national objectives.
The success of neutralism turned it into a more or 
less dogmatic ideology which meant a loss of realism, 
of efficiency, because life changes, situations change 
and that you cannot use perpetually the same for­
mula, The Greek prime minister has proved to have 
an extraordinary sense of pragmatism. He does not 
see why he should leave NATO, if NATO is not bad 
for Greek interests, just because one of the dogmas 
of neutralism is not to be a member of NATO.
I think that here lies one of the basic differences 
between Andreas Papandreou and George Papa­
dopulos. Andreas Papandreou lacked realism to a 
very high degree. Instead of creating his own way, he 
followed too closely the path of others which was 
already known to his enemies. But basically his two 
main nationalistic slogans were correct and that is 
why they had such a profound appeal on the people. 
These two slogans were: 1) «The King reigns but 
must not govern», 2) «Greece to the Greeks».
The King from the start of the independent State 
of Greece, in the 19th century, up to now, has al­
ways been the representative of the interests of 
Great Powers in Athens. To rid Greece of foreign 
influences without neutralizing the political power 
of the King was nonsense. So any true Nationalist 
ought to agree with this first slogan. Ex-prime minis­
ter Karamanlis in his conflict with the royal family 
adopted the same view, and one must not forget 
that Papadopulos was a supporter of Karamanlis.
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Is it Andreas Papandreou or George Papadopulos 
who succeeded in ousting the King from his political 
strongholds? In politics, as usual, it is not what you 
say but what you succeed in doing that matters.
C. Modernism plus religion. Efficiency is a basic 
word of the regime. Like kemalism in Turkey before 
the war, papadopulism means catching up with the 
most advanced techniques of the West, because a 
strong Greece cannot exist without a modern indus­
trialized State, but unlike kemalism religion is not 
considered an opium for the people, but one of the 
basic constituents of the Greek soul. Rejecting the 
Greek Orthodox Church is rejecting a great part of 
national tradition, in the same way that an Arab 
nationalist cannot reject Islam. The western inspired 
Greek liberals like Andreas Papandreou, who in the 
19th and 20th centuries overlooked religious tradi­
tions, overlooked a basic element in the understanding 
of the Greek peasantry who composes still to-day 
50% of the population. That is why Andreas’ second 
slogan: «Greece to the Greeks», was modified to 
«Greece of Greek Christians» which is the basic 
slogan of the present regime.
D. Anticommunism plus fear of Russia. Papado­
pulism is basically anticommunist because socially 
it represents the petty bourgeoisie and a peasantry 
of small owners, as in Greece the agrarian reform 
was decided and executed as far back as 1917. But 
the main reason of its stern anticommunism is the 
fear of Russia as an imperialist State.
Slavism, Hellenism and Turkism, are three com­
ponents of one world, the world of Eastern Europe 
and Asia Minor. The bonds of civilization are very 
tight between those three groups. But brothers often 
fight one another more strongly than strangers. 
Each of these peoples headed Empires in the same 
area which struggled for supremacy: the Greeks the 
Byzantine Empire, the Turks the Ottoman Empire, 
the Russians the Russian Empire. The first two 
empires were destroyed and after the Greco-Turkish 
war of 1919-1922, an equilibrium was installed be­
tween Greeks and Turks, basically satisfied with 
their respective territories, except for the current 
dispute on Cyprus.
But the Russian Empire not only is still intact but 
is even more formidable than ever before, struggling 
to make its way into the Mediterranean Sea. If, for 
instance, Russia was still tzarist and the Slavic Bal­
kan States still backward kingdoms, perhaps Greece 
to-day would have been communist. But the per­
spective of entering the same family, with Russia as 
the supreme protector, and with Bulgaria, the favorite 
of Russia, dominating Greek Macedonia, was enough 
for the Greek people to reject communism, called
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very accurately by them Slavo-communism, or even 
Bulgaro-communism. The military who did the coup 
of 1967, knew something about this threat as they 
had been fighting the communists up to 1949 and 
are conscious of having saved their country from 
Bulgarian domination.
In such a context the problem of NATO and neu­
tralism looks different to Greek nationalists than, for 
instance, to Arab nationalists. The fear of Russia is 
even greater than in Turkey which has not experi­
enced a communist guerrilla war. Here is another 
difference between Andreas Papandreou and George 
Papadopulos because Andreas was not well enough 
acquainted with Greek reality.
E. Planified economy and social reforms. There is 
no basic difference in the economic and social ideas 
of Andreas Papandreou and those of the present 
regime. Both arc in favor of non compulsory economic 
planification of the French type that would give a 
guiding role to the State in a private owned economy. 
Both are in favor of extensive social reforms and 
both feel no sympathy for the Greek establishment. 
The concern of the present regime for social justice 
is such that severe measures against the privileges 
of the establishment are not excluded in the long run. 
Pattakos, the vice-president, said last year on Sep­
tember 8: «Liberty does not exist where there is no 
dignity. And dignity does not exist in societies where 
prevails the ruthless rule of exploitation of man by 
man.»
All this was not denied by Andreas Papandreou in 
an interview he gave in Paris to the French news­
paper Le Monde, on January 25, 1968, shortly after 
being liberated by Papadopulos. The question of 
Le Monde was the following: «It is said that the 
colonels have a secret admiration for your nationalist 
ideas and your economic theories, and that they 
have enen adopted in its greater part the project of 
a five year plan that you presented. The colonels 
are of poor origin and they do not belong to this 
financial oligarchy that you have so much denounced. 
They have liberated you and have allowed you to 
leave Greece. Why then are you so much against 
them?» And here is Papandreou’s answer: «Because 
a gulf separates us. I am a democrat. They are dic­
tators... They are nearly uneducated people and 
they want to impose the army as the elite of the 
nation... They are violently xénophobes.»
Papandreou’s answer indicates clearly that his 
disagreement with Papadopulos is not on the sub­
stance but on the means. Even if the aim is good, 
he does not accept dictatorship to attain it. As a 
politician he does not accept that the army, even in 
the special conditions of Greece, take the place of 
the political elite. He seems to think that to be able
to make a progressive revolution you must be a 
University professor and that, for instance, a pro­
letarian revolution could not be headed by a worker. 
Finally he condemns the resentment of Greeks a- 
gainst foreign influence as an excessive feeling. But 
with what is known of Papandreou’s political sym­
pathies before 1967, one is allowed to doubt that 
these arguments are the main reasons for his opposi­
tion to the present regime. After all, Atatürk or 
Nasser, were officers like Papadopulos, and they 
were no more educated than the Greek prime minis­
ter. I think the main reason is the natural resentment 
anyone would have against the man that kicked you 
out of your seat, and, in fact, many of the young of­
ficers reputed in favor of Andreas before 1967 are 
presently supporters of Papadopulos.
II. Tactics oî the regime
On the 2nd August 1968, the spokesman of the 
Greek Government said ironically that Andreas Pa­
pandreou was no more capable of making a revolu­
tion in the past than he is of making a counter­
revolution to-day. The common reproach made to 
Andreas’ tactics between 1964 and 1967, was huge 
imprudence. A good politician must not unveil all 
his cards at once. Andreas Papandreou was making 
passionate statements which frightened the Greek 
establishment, the royal family and the Americans. 
Even the extreme left thought he talked too much and 
some of its members suspected him of being a prov- 
ocator, which was certainly not true. Papadopulos 
is doing exactly the contrary. As a former intelli­
gence officer he realizes the importance of secrecy, 
that you must use words, not to inform your enemy 
but as sleeping powder.
Greece is in the position of Rumania. She belongs 
to a system that will crush her if she makes an in­
dependent move. So she tries to act armour-plated 
with reassuring statements that she will never dis­
turb the system. Nothing has changed and nothing 
will change. Greece cannot speak like Libya who has 
behind her the Arab world. The regime’s tactics are 
very simple in theory but excessively difficult in 
practice: it must make no move that would be con­
sidered by the Americans as a threat to their in­
terests as long as Greece is not strong enough to 
get rid of foreign pressures. Gain time to consolidate 
itself is still its main preoccupation. At the same time 
it tries not to make a negative move against any coun­
try. In this effort, the regime is greatly helped by the 
present trend of rapprochement between the United 
States and Soviet Union. It tries to improve its re­
lations with everybody: with France, with the Arab 
countries, with Israel, with Turkey, with all the 
communist Balkan countries, with Bulgaria as well
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as with Albania, and also with Soviet Russia. China 
is certainly not excluded in the long run. If relations 
were bad up to now with Great Britain, Italy, Ger­
many and the Scandinavian countries, it is certainly 
not due to the will of Athens. Relations are excellent 
with Cyprus. There is complete understanding be­
tween these two nationalists, Papadopulos and Ma- 
karios. In fact the Cypriot president would have been 
overthrown to-day by a coup without the unrestricted 
support of Papadopulos and the Greek army.
During this first phase, while the regime tries to 
avoid all blows, waiting for the second phase to at­
tack, Papadopulos cannot gain the support of his 
people for a precise policy of national independence 
because this would oblige him to publicize such a 
policy and thus unveil his cards. So he cannot really 
answer the accusations of the emigrates that he is 
in fact an American puppet. The danger in this case 
is that the people will not understand for what pur­
pose Papadopulos suppressed democratic institutions. 
The sincere disgust for the old political elite, thorough­
ly corrupted except for some very few exceptions, 
is not in itself enough to rally the support of the 
people to the regime. The danger of a communist 
takeover is not convincing. The colonels knew that 
the Americans are ready to accept nearly anything if 
coated with anticommunism. Many are those who 
made their career with American help, having on 
their visiting cards just this magic word: anticom­
munist. So this argument was mainly for American 
consumption and in order to allow the colonels to 
make use for their coup of April 21, of the Greek 
version of NATO emergency plan against communist 
subversion, the «Prometheus plan». The Greek peo­
ple do not believe that there was a danger of com­
munist take-over in 1967 and I do not think Prime 
Minister Papadopulos believes it either.
The Greek people have shown many times in the 
past that when they are conscious that their interests 
are at stake they do not hesitate to take up arms. 
They have the reputation of being very courageous and 
good fighters. The argument of the emigrates that the 
Greeks still remember the hardships of the civil war 
of 1946-1949 and do not want a new one is not con­
vincing. Twenty years have elapsed since then and 
a new generation has arisen. So there was real dan­
ger for Papadopulos of having to face guerrilla 
warfare.
This danger was avoided for two main reasons: 
First the virtual dethronement of the King only a few 
months after the coup, in 1967. King Constantine 
and his mother Queen Frederica had become very 
unpopular. At the elections of May 28, 1967, can­
celled by the revolution of 21st April, the people 
were prepared to give the majority to the Papandreous 
as victims of the royal family. It would have been in
fact an antimonarchical majority. The King was the 
symbol of the establishment and of foreign influence. 
The people were informed of the fact, revealed in the 
international press, that the King with his royalist 
generals was preparing a coup that was at the last 
second forestalled by the colonels’ coup of April 21. 
The compromise between the King’s group and the 
colonels’ group only lasted from April 21 to December 
13, 1967, when the King attacked the colonels and 
lost. The royalists were then immediately cleared out 
of government and army. In less than a year the colo­
nels had succeeded a tremendous and nearly unbeliev­
able accomplishment: liberate the Greek people from 
the chief agent of foreign domination. No politician, 
not even Andreas Papandreou would have ever dream­
ed of succeeding in such a short time. If the coup 
of April 21 had not occurred, Greece would have 
been to-day in the hands of a royal dictatorship 
like the one it experienced under Metaxas from 1936 
to 1941.
The second reason why the Greek people did not 
revolt against the colonels was the social and econom­
ic measures taken by the regime. Primacy was given 
to the provinces and to the peasants where the present 
leaders have their social roots, but the two big cities 
of Athens and Salonica were not neglected either. 
The great problem of Greek agriculture was the 
peasant debts. In 1968 they were all cancelled by the 
government who added to this spectacular measure 
considerable social and financial help to farmers. 
Farm workers first and then industry workers saw 
in the same year their wages increased by 15%. At 
the same time the habit of the Greek businessmen to 
practice extensively huge fiscal frauds was severely 
punished. The result was that the income declared 
in 1969 increased by more than 70% compared to the 
income declared in 1967. Expenses for public social 
insurance nearly doubled this year compared with 
1966. The regime has from the beginning declared 
war on bureaucracy. For instance, last July, the head 
of the passport division of the ministry of Home 
Affairs was fired on the spot, after vice-president 
Pattakos entered by surprise the room in Athens 
where passports are delivered and noticed that the 
people had to wait too long. In government offices 
many old civil servants have been replaced by young 
men, considered as young modern technocrats.
The first five year plan of the regime was launched 
in January 1968. National independence is illusion 
without economic strength, that is why economic 
development is the religion of the regime. This plan 
gives great importance to regional development in 
order to privilege the provinces and thus fill the gap 
between Athens and Salonica and the rest of the 
country. 1969 proved a successful year for this plan. 
Industrial production increased by 12%.
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III. The opposite side: Scylla and Charybdis or the 
positions of the United States and Soviet Union
A. United States. It is very probable that the United 
States and even Great Britain would have backed a 
royal dictatorship that would have been established 
with a coup d’état, the one that was prevented thanks 
to the prompt action of the colonels on April 21. 
In the past, Great Britain backed the Greek royal 
dictatorship of 1936-1941. The colonels’ coup took 
the American and the English Governments by 
complete surprise. Their man was the King surround­
ed by his royalist generals. These colonels said they 
did the coup for the benefit of the generals, the King 
and Western interests. They had launched the Greek 
military emergency plan against communist subver­
sion, called «Prometheus», a part of NATO frame­
work dated April 25, 1966 and signed by the King 
and the Greek prime minister of the time. They launch­
ed the plan on behalf of the generals, the King and 
the government, but in fact without their approval. 
Like Prometheus, the Greek Titan who stole fire from 
the gods to give it to man, the colonels had stolen 
the «Prometheus plan» for the benefit, as they thought, 
of the Greek people.
The King and the Americans certainly did not be­
lieve the colonels’ argument who stated that com­
munist danger was so imminent that they had to 
send the coded signal in the night of the 20th April, 
to set the Prometheus plan in motion. But if they 
opposed the colonels, they were afraid of an armed 
clash between two anticommunist groups that could 
benefit the communists. After all, these military were 
intelligence officers that had been in excellent terms 
with their American friends. So the King preferred 
to negotiate. He accepted the fait accompli but the 
seats of the new government were shared between 
the royalists and the revolutionaries. The new prime 
minister, Kollias, was a close friend of the royal 
family. The leader of the coup, George Papadopulos, 
was only given the seat of minister of Information. 
The King thought that as most of the royalist generals 
were still at their posts in the army, he had not lost 
his cards and that he could quickly regain the com­
plete control of the situation.
The American government accepted the King’s 
tactics and only tried to keep pressure on the revolu­
tionaries, first by publishing one week after the coup, 
on the 28th April, a statement of the Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk, clearly showing that he was on 
the side of the King and not of Papadopulos and, 
second, by deciding twenty-five days after the coup, 
to delay the shipment to Greece of heavy military 
equipment, mainly planes, tanks and ships. This 
decision was anounced by the Department of State 
on the 17th May 1967. Nevertheless, the supply of
light equipment, such as ammunitions and spare parts, 
was never stopped.
From May 1967 up to the present moment, the 
supply of heavy military equipment to Greece con­
tinued to be suspended, but the eventuality of its 
resumption was continuously left open in order to 
exert constant pressure on Papadopulos. The resump­
tion of such supplies was approved by the Depart­
ment of State only for a single shipment, in October 
1968, because the Soviet threat had at that time 
greatly increased with their invasion of Czechoslo­
vakia and the reinforcement of the Russian fleet in 
the Mediterranean Sea.
On the 13th December 1967, the King launched a 
counter-coup against the revolutionaries and lost in 
one day. The King’s defeat was so quick and his 
move proved so plainly that the people were not 
backing him, that the American 6th Fleet in the 
Mediterranea did not intervene to help him. The 
American press was not as cautious as the American 
government and did not hesitate to call the colonels 
bandits and fascists. The fact is, I think, that by 
deciding not to intervene in Greece, on the 13th 
December 1967, to help the King, the American gov­
ernment lost the game. Papadopulos who very nat­
urally feared this intervention, acted in such a way 
that he proved he was a great politician. This was a 
discovery for nearly everybody who accused him of 
being a narrow-minded officer mentally disturbed. 
Since then he has amply confirmed his political 
gifts.
When the King flew pitifully from Greece and found 
refuge with all his family in Rome, Papadopulos could 
have immediately proclaimed Republic. Such a move 
would have, I think, aroused the enthusiasm of the 
majority of the Greek people. It was a wonderful 
occasion for the regime to acquire popular support. 
In fact, in many public offices, civil servants were 
taking down the portraits of the royal couple. Papa­
dopulos gave the order to put them back on the walls 
and said that there was no question of abolishing 
Monarchy and even on the 11th January 1968, 
answered British journalists with a «Long live the 
King».
The dangers of abolishing Monarchy were the fol­
lowing: 1) Papadopulos would have lost totally the 
support of the United States which would have per­
haps decided to intervene in Greece by force to 
overthrow him. 2) Even though the majority of the 
people were against the King, there still existed a 
minority, a great part of the establishment and of the 
army, in favor of Monarchy. Such a revolutionary 
move would have perhaps created a strong enough 
reaction to allow the King to head a small popular 
resistance which, with the help of the Western coun­
tries, could cause civil war. 3) Inside the révolu-
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tionary group, complete harmony did not exist. 
Papadopulos was not yet the recognized and undis- 
putable leader of the revolution. Past experiences in 
the History of Greece, during the Greek Republic of 
1924-1935, has shown and the present history of the 
Arab States shows, that when a revolutionary leader 
becomes the sole symbol of the State, he encounters 
the danger of being overthrown by another leader. 
The History of the Greek Republic of 1924-1935 was 
a long succession of military coups d’état which final­
ly ended with the return of the ousted king. The 
souvenir of the fate of General Kassem in Irak is 
also instructive.
Papadopulos declared and still declares to-day, 
that he did not oust the King. King Constantine 
himself decided to leave the country and is still wel­
come if he wants to return under certain conditions. 
Constantine, still hoping that he has not lost his 
throne for ever, dare not attack the regime with 
violent statements and accepts to negotiate with 
Papadopulos the eventuality of his return. The link 
between the two men existed up to the 19th July of 
this year through the Greek Secretary of State, 
Pipinelis, who was all his life a personal friend of the 
Greek royal dynasty. Pipinelis had also always been 
a good friend of the United States, so he was at the 
same time the main link between Athens and Wash­
ington. His presence in the government at the head 
of the Greek Foreign Office, was a kind of guarantee 
given to the United States that the foreign policy of 
Athens would maintain a pro-American line. As a 
stern supporter of Greco-Turkish friendship he was 
a’so very useful for the Cyprus question. The mystery 
of his stay in the government even after the departure 
of his King who had been the symbol of his whole 
life has not yet been elucidated. Perhaps he took this 
decision to please the American government who, 
otherwise, would have no one left in the Greek 
government on whom to count. Whatever the real 
reason the fact remains that the guarantee he gave by 
his presence in the government, helped Papadopulos’ 
tactics very much.
On the 19th July, Pipinelis died. It is most probable 
that Washington tried to replace him by another pro- 
American, but Papadopulos decided to cumulate with 
his positions of prime minister and minister for 
National Defence, the duty of Secretary of State. He 
nevertheless gave the Americans a small satisfaction 
by appointing as Under-Secretary of State a friend of 
Washington, Mr. Palamas, who had represented his 
country in NATO headquarters since 1962.
Now, in this very tough game, Washington seems 
to be the loser up to now and certainly not Papa­
dopulos. The King is still in exile and as the Athe­
nian paper Eleutheros Kosmos put it on the 31st 
May: «The question of the King has been put in the
frig». Meanwhile the years fly past and the people 
forget the King. In some years there probably will 
be very few royalists left in Greece.
The pressure exerted on the Government by sus­
pending the supply of heavy military equipment seems 
to-day to be neutralized by the fact that France offers 
to sell to Greece, under very good financial conditions, 
any military equipment she could not obtain from the 
Americans. The strategic position of Greece, already 
very important, increases steadily with the importance 
taken by Russian influence in the Middle East and 
in the Mediterranea.
B. Soviet Union. Soviet Union from the first day 
of the colonels’ experience follows very carefully 
what is happening in Greece. It is evident that she 
could not approve officially a regime that makes 
passionate anticommunist statements and declares 
constantly its indefectible loyalty to NATO. So she 
is obliged to call the Greek regime a fascist one. 
But in fact more and more Greek communists are 
furious against the real attitude of Moscow and its 
satellites, mainly Bulgaria, because they maintain 
exceptionally cordial relations with Athens and de­
velop their commercial relations with the Greek re­
gime. The tremendous propaganda campaign against 
the colonels, mainly after the King’s exile, was ex­
clusively organized in and with the help of Western 
countries and even Western governments, especial­
ly Great Britain and the Scandinavian governments. 
I have consulted the greatest part of the mass of 
literature written by non Greeks who attack the re­
gime. There is nearly nothing coming from the Soviet 
Union and the communist countries of Eastern Europe.
Here are some extracts of the important interview 
given by the Greek Secretary of State for Foreign Af­
fairs on the 9th May of this year, following the visit 
to Athens of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister: «We 
have noticed the moderation and care with which 
the Bulgarian press has followed political events in 
Greece. Compared to other countries, their attitude 
towards our present national government is among 
the least hostile.» And about Albania the Greek 
Foreign Minister stated: «Lately the Albanian border 
authorities have shown much understanding and have 
sent back on their own initiative, fugitives from the 
Greek soil who sought refuge in Albania. The Al­
banian press has also been neutral for several months 
now, concerning the Greek questions, if not com­
pletely silent.»
The Greek government in its effort to develop 
commercial relations with the communist countries 
has been criticized in the West. The minister for 
Economic Coordination, Makarezos, answered on 
the 31st May of this year: «Between the right of the 
[continued on page 52]
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